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MINORITY PARTICIPATION IN KOSOVO 
ELECTIONS:  
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 
Voting is a fundamental democratic right that empowers people to exercise their civil 
control over the politics and politicians, over the different branches of power, over the 
development paths of their countries. Democratic electoral systems in Europe vary 
greatly. But the electoral systems alone, although contributing  to the specific 
architectures of the national democracies, are not the only factors that determine the 
quality of the democracy in place. Focused on legislation, rules and procedures, policy 
analysts sometimes tend to look at voters as a “beneficiaries” a nd not as the active 
subjects who in fact have the power to change the status quo or to contribute to 
deformities of the political system in place, by NOT exercising their political and civil  
rights.  
Based on findings gathered from the field 1 ,  this paper will look at the concerns and 
issues raised by members of non-Albanian and non-Serbian minority communities in 
Kosovo and will assess those in the light of the weight of the minority vote as provided 
by the respective legislative framework. T he analysis aims at focusing the attention of 
stakeholders, national and international organizations, and policy and decision makers, 
about the risks that the newly born democracy would face if no attention w ere to be 
paid to the “subjective” issues that challenge the participation of minorities in elections 
or census polls.  
Zora Popova, June 2013 
ECMI Working Paper #69 
 
 
I. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING  & 
ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK  
According to the Kosovo Constitution
2
, which 
entered into force on June 15, 2008, independent 
Kosovo is a democratic Republic based on the 
principle of separation of powers and the checks 
and balances among them (Article 4.1). The 
President of the Republic as a Head of State 
represents the unity of the nations. He is elected 
by the Assembly in a secret ballot with the 2/3 
majority of all deputies of the Assembly for a 
mandate of 5 years (with maximum of 2 
mandates in office). The Prime Minister is the 
Head of the Government, elected together with 
the proposed Cabinet by the Assembly with a  
 
 
 
majority vote. The mandate of the Cabinet is 4 
years.  
The legislative power of Kosovo lies with 
the unicameral Assembly of 120 deputies, 
elected by secret ballot on the basis of open lists 
for a mandate of 4 years. The composition of the 
Assembly is defined by the Constitution, Article 
64:  
1. The Assembly has one hundred twenty (120) 
deputies elected by secret ballot on the basis 
of open lists. The seats in the Assembly are 
distributed amongst all parties, coalitions, 
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citizens‟ initiatives and independent 
candidates in proportion to the number of 
valid votes received by them in the election 
to the Assembly. 
 
2. In the framework of this distribution, twenty 
(20) of the one hundred twenty (120) seats 
are guaranteed for representation of 
communities that are not in the majority in 
Kosovo as follows: 
 
(1) Parties, coalitions, citizens' initiatives and 
independent candidates having declared 
themselves representing the Kosovo Serb 
Community shall have the total number of 
seats won through the open election, with a 
minimum ten (10) seats guaranteed if the 
number of seats won is less than ten (10); 
 
(2)  Parties, coalitions, citizens' initiatives and 
independent candidates having declared 
themselves representing the other 
Communities shall have the total number of 
seats won through the open election, with a 
minimum number of seats in the Assembly 
guaranteed as follows: the Roma 
community, one (1) seat; the Ashkali 
community, one (1) seat; the Egyptian 
community, one (1) seat; and one (1) 
additional seat will be awarded to either the 
Roma, the Ashkali or the Egyptian 
community with the highest overall votes; 
the Bosnian community, three (3) seats; the 
Turkish community, two (2) seats; and the 
Gorani community, one (1) seat if the 
number of seats won by each community is 
less than the number guaranteed. 
 
Apart from the Constitution, the Kosovo 
electoral system has been regulated also by the 
2008 Law on General Elections
3
 (LGE), rules 
developed by the Central Election Commission 
(CES) and other pieces of legislation such as the 
Citizenship Law, Law on Languages and 
relevant sections of the Criminal Code, the Law 
on Financing of Political Parties (LFPP)
4
. 
Kosovo is currently a single, multi-
member electoral district
5
 (LGE, Article 10) 
with a proportional representation voting system 
using the Sainte-Laguë method for allocation of 
seats.  
In order to run in elections political entities 
(parties, coalitions, independent candidates and 
citizens‘ initiatives) need to be certified by the 
CEC at least 60 days prior to elections. The 
reference legislation for the certification of 
political entities and candidates is the Law nr 
03/L-073 on General Elections in Republic of 
Kosovo, Law nr 03/L-072 on Local Elections in 
Republic of Kosovo and CEC Electoral Rule 
08/2009 On Certification of Political Entities 
and their candidates which foresees that every 
political entity wishing to run for the elections 
must apply for certification with the Central 
Election Commission (CEC)
6
. Registered parties 
are automatically certified, but they need to 
inform CEC about any changes in their legal 
status (LGE, article 15.3). Parties should also 
notify CEC in case they do not wish to be 
certified for elections (LGE, article 15.4). 
Certification fees are defined by CEC rules, 
which also specify the requirements for 
certification
7
. 
 
Apart from setting in advance the formal 
frameworks of the political contest, the process 
of certification is in fact the moment when 
political parties re-assert the electorate they 
represent. According to LGE, Article 15.11:  
 
“Each Political Entity shall indicate in its 
application whether it wishes to contest any 
of the seats guaranteed for the 
representation of Kosovo Serb and other 
non-majority communities under Article 64 
of the Constitution.” 
 
The certified political entities appear on an 
―open list‖ ballot. A voter can cast their vote for 
a certified political entity only but may also 
indicate one preferred candidate of the 
respective list.  
A person is eligible to vote in an 
election, if they are at least 18 years of age on 
the day of the elections and is registered as 
citizens of Kosovo in the Central Civil Registry, 
resides outside Kosovo (having left Kosovo on 
or after 1.01.1998) or has obtained a refugee 
status (LGE, Article 5) 
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The LGE Article 111.2 (a) sets an 
election threshold of 5% for political entities 
representing the majority community of Kosovo. 
There is no threshold for the seats reserved for 
the minority communities.  
According to the transitional provisions 
of the Constitution (Article 148.1), that in the 
Assembly elections of 2010 the fixed number of 
reserved seats were allocated to communities in 
addition to the seats won as a result of the 
general vote surpassing the 5% threshold. Since 
this was the last period of validity of the 
transitional provisions, the seats won by a 
minority party surpassing the election threshold 
will be deduced from the number of seats 
reserved for the respective minority.  
Law on Self-Government in Kosovo
8
 
does not provide reserved seats in the Municipal 
Assemblies for member of minority political 
entities running for elections, but it stipulates 
that  
 
In municipalities where at least ten per cent 
(10%) of the citizens belong to Communities 
not in the majority in those municipalities, a 
post of the Chairperson of the Municipal 
Assembly for Communities shall be reserved 
for a representative of these communities 
(LSG, Article 54.1), and 
 
The post of the Deputy Chairperson of the 
Municipal Assembly for Communities shall 
be held by the non-majority community‟s 
candidate who received the most votes on 
the open list of candidates for election to the 
Municipal Assembly (LSG, Article 54.1) 
 
In those municipalities, where at least 10% of 
the citizens belong to non-majority 
communities, there shall be also a Deputy 
Mayor for Communities in those municipalities 
(LSG, Article 61.1). The Law also guarantees 
representation of non-majority communities in 
the Communities Committee (LSG, Article 53).    
 
II. THE WEIGHT OF MINORITY 
REPRESENTATION 
One of the opening articles of the Constitution 
(Article 3), preceding even the Form of 
Governance provisions, stipulates that Kosovo 
guarantees equality before law to all citizens and 
provides specific rights to the members of the 
non-majority communities
9
.  
 
 The exercise of public authority in the 
Republic of Kosovo shall be based upon the 
principles of equality of all individuals 
before the law and with full respect for 
internationally recognized fundamental 
human rights and freedoms, as well as 
protection of the rights of and participation 
by all Communities and their members. 
 
The rights of the non-majority Communities in 
Kosovo and the obligations of the State to 
implement and safeguard those are defined by 
the Constitution not only in the Chapter III: 
Rights Of Communities And Their Members (e.g. 
Article 57, Article 58, Article 59), but also in 
provisions concerning the institutional 
arrangements of the state and the structures of 
the executive (e.g. Article 60, Article 61, Article 
96), legislative (e.g. Article 64) and judiciary 
powers (e.g. Article 103,104, 108), the local 
self-government (e.g. Article 62) or the use of 
languages (Article 5). The Constitution also 
ensures the gender equality as a fundamental 
value for the democratic development of the 
society (Article 7; Article 71) and regulates the 
representation in the public institutions.  
Apart from the Constitution, the rights 
of communities in Kosovo are guaranteed also 
by a number of pieces of legislation. Among the 
most important laws are the Law on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Rights of 
Communities and Their Members in Kosovo 
(LPPRC) with the amendments of December 
2011, the Law on Languages, the Law on 
General Elections, and the Law on Self-
Government in Kosovo. Directly applicable 
international agreements and instruments, and in 
the case of conflict, have priority over 
provisions of laws and other acts of public 
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institutions, as stipulated by Article 22 of the 
Constitution, are
10
:   
 
(1) Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 
(2) European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and its Protocols; 
(3) International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and its Protocols; 
(4) Council of Europe Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities; 
(5) Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination; 
(6) Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women; 
 
The Law on Citizenship can be seen as having 
an indirect impact on the rights of the 
communities by not providing any restrictions to 
citizenship on the basis of origin and by 
allowing dual citizenship.  
Although 20 reserved seats for the 
representatives of the Kosovo minority 
communities (10 for the Serbian community and 
10 for the representatives of the other 
communities
11
) out of 120 Assembly seats might 
seem a small proportion of the total number, in 
fact the weight of the minority seats should be 
evaluated against their role in the decision-
making process in Kosovo and for in the 
structures of government and powers. The 
following examples illustrate the importance of 
the minority representation. 
 
Assembly Level 
 
Assembly Leadership: Two of these five 
Deputy Presidents of the Assembly represent 
non-majority communities in the Assembly - 
one Deputy President from the seats guaranteed 
for the Serb community, and one appointed from 
the deputies holding seats reserved for the other 
minority communities (Constitution, Article 
67.4). 
 
Assembly Committees: At least one vice chair 
of each parliamentary committee (permanent, 
operational and ad hoc committees) shall be 
from the deputies of a Community different 
from the Community of the chair (Article 77.4). 
This means that even in a case when all 
Committee chairs are allocated to the 
representatives of the majority community, all of 
these Committees would have at least one vice-
chair from the minority communities. The 
current standing, functional and sub-committees 
in the Kosovo Assembly (total of 13), there are 2 
chair-persons from the minority communities 
and 13 vice-chair persons. 
Particular provisions are in place with 
regard to the composition of the permanent 
Committee on Rights and Interests of 
Communities of the Assembly of Kosovo 
(Article 78). This committee is composed of one 
third (1/3) of members holding seats reserved for 
the Serbian Community, one third (1/3) of 
members holding deputy seats reserved for other 
the minority communities and one third (1/3) of 
members from the majority community 
representatives. Currently, the 12-member 
committee is in fact composed by 4 members 
representing the majority community in Kosovo, 
4 members, representing the Serb community 
(one of which is chair) and 4 from the other 
communities (one of which – vice-chair).  
The Committee on Rights and Interests 
of Communities is just one of the permanent 
committees of the Assembly, but in fact it is a 
very powerful mechanism, the functions of 
which are defined by the Constitution (Article 
78). At the request of any member of the 
Presidency of the Assembly, a law may be 
submitted to the Committee for its consideration. 
On its own initiative or addressing concerns of 
Communities, the Committee may propose laws 
and other measures within the responsibilities of 
the Assembly.  Members are also allowed to 
issue individual opinions. The Committee takes 
decision with a majority vote. 
In summary, the total number of key 
positions in the present Assembly of Kosovo, 
allocated to deputies representing minority 
communities of Kosovo and holding reserved 
seats is 21: 5 of which specially designated to 
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the Serb representatives and 5 to the members of 
the other non-majority communities. Surely, in 
case of change of the number of Assembly 
committees, the total number would change 
accordingly. 
 
Legislative Powers: The important role of the 
deputies occupying the seats reserved for the 
minority communities in Kosovo becomes 
clearer when taking into consideration the 
weight of their votes in the legislative 
procedures. According to Article 81 of the 
Constitution, the adoption, amendment or repeal 
of ―legislation of vital interest‖ (listed below) 
require both the majority of the Assembly 
deputies present and voting and the majority of 
the Assembly deputies present and voting 
holding seats reserved or guaranteed for 
representatives of Communities that are not in 
the majority. This means that in the legislative 
procedures with respect to the:  
 
(1) Laws changing municipal 
boundaries, establishing or abolishing 
municipalities, defining the scope of 
powers of municipalities and their 
participation in intermunicipal and 
cross-border relations; 
(2) Laws implementing the rights of 
Communities and their members, other 
than those set forth in the Constitution; 
(3) Laws on the use of language; 
(4) Laws on local elections; 
 (5) Laws on protection of cultural 
heritage; 
(6) Laws on religious freedom or on 
agreements with religious communities; 
(7) Laws on education; 
(8) Laws on the use of symbols, 
including Community symbols and on 
public holidays, 
 
one deputy representing minority communities 
in Kosovo and occupying a reserved seat equals 
five representatives of the Albanian majority. In 
the present Assembly (due to the application of 
the transitional provisions and the higher 
number of minority deputies the proportion is 
approximately 1 to 4).  
 
Deputies holding reserved seats in the 
Assembly also have the possibility to control 
any amendments to the Constitution of Kosovo. 
As stipulated by Article 144 of the Constitution:  
 
Any amendment shall require for its 
adoption the approval of two thirds (2/3) of 
all deputies of the Assembly including two 
thirds (2/3) of all deputies of the Assembly 
holding reserved or guaranteed seats for 
representatives of communities that are not 
in the majority in the Republic of Kosovo. 
 
Hence, no amendment to the Constitution of 
Kosovo can be approved, unless such is 
supported by at least 14 of the deputies, 
representing the minority communities and 
holding reserved seats in the Assembly.  
 
 
Presidential Level  
 
The Community Consultative Council (CCC) 
under the auspices of the President is also an 
important instrument for protection of minority 
rights in Kosovo. According to LPPRC Article 
12.6, the members of the Council, representing 
communities may also be Assembly 
representatives of the minorities as follows:  
 The Serb community – five 
representatives, two of whom may be 
members of the Assembly of Kosovo 
 The Roma, Egyptian and Ashkali 
communities - two representatives 
respectively, one of each of whom may 
be a member of the Assembly of 
Kosovo 
 The Bosniak and Turk communities 
shall have three representatives 
respectively, one of each of whom may 
be a member of the Assembly of 
Kosovo 
 Gorani community shall have two 
members, one of whom may be a 
member of the Assembly of Kosovo 
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Presenting the minority communities with the 
possibility to comment at an early stage 
legislative or policy initiatives of the 
Government of to suggest such initiatives and to 
seek the incorporation of their view in project or 
programs, the CCC is an important instrument 
for ensuring the minority participation and 
control over the decision making process in 
Kosovo.  
In summary, at the Presidential level, a total 
of 13 positions may be allocated to the 20 
reserved seats (currently 25, under the 
provisions of the transitional Article 148) for 
deputies representing the minorities in Kosovo, 
divided as follows:  
 6 positions for the Serb community (1 
Deputy President and 5 members 
(optional) of the CCC) 
 7 positions for the members of the other 
communities (1 Deputy President and 6 
members (optional) of the CCC) 
 
 
Governmental Level 
 
The Assembly members, representing minority 
communities, can have also a direct impact on 
the formation of the Government after elections. 
Articles 96.3 and 96.4 of the Constitution 
establish that there shall be at least one Minister 
from the Kosovo Serb Community and one 
Minister from another Kosovo non-majority 
Community (and a third one in case that the total 
number of Ministers in the Cabinet is more than 
twelve). At least two Deputy Minister seats 
should be allocated for representatives of the 
Kosovo Serb Community and two others – for 
the other Kosovo non-majority communities. In 
a Cabinet of more than 12 Ministers, two 
additional Deputy Minister seats should be 
allocated respectively to the Serb and other 
minority communities. 
   
The selection of these Ministers and 
Deputy Ministers shall be determined 
after consultations with parties, 
coalitions or groups representing 
Communities that are not in the majority 
in Kosovo. If appointed from outside the 
membership of the Kosovo Assembly, 
these Ministers and Deputy Ministers 
shall require the formal endorsement of 
the majority of Assembly deputies 
belonging to parties, coalitions, citizens' 
initiatives and independent candidates 
having declared themselves to represent 
the Community concerned  (Article 
96.3). 
 
 
Judicial Level 
 
Assembly members representing minority 
communities in Kosovo and holding reserved 
seats are in power to elect 4 members of the 
Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC) total of 13 
members) – an independent institution to ensure 
that the Kosovo courts are independent, 
professional and impartial and fully reflect the 
multi-ethnic nature of Kosovo and follow the 
principles of gender equality. Apart from 
requiring that the Kosovo Judicial Council shall 
give preference in the appointment of judges to 
members of Communities that are 
underrepresented in the judiciary as provided by 
law (Article 108.2), the Constitution specifies 
that:  
 
108.6 (3) two (2) members shall be elected 
by the deputies of the Assembly holding 
reserved or guaranteed seats for the Kosovo 
Serb community and at least one of the two 
must be a judge; 
 
108.6 (4) two (2) members shall be elected 
by the deputies of the Assembly holding 
reserved or guaranteed seats for other 
Communities and at least one of the two 
must be a judge. 
 
This selection of members of KJC has further 
impact on the representation of minority 
communities in the judicial system of Kosovo, 
since  
 
108.9. Candidates for judicial positions 
that are reserved for members of 
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Communities that are not in the majority 
in Kosovo may only be recommended for 
appointment by the majority of members 
of the Council elected by Assembly 
deputies holding seats reserved or 
guaranteed for members of communities 
that are not in the majority in Kosovo…  
 
108.10. Candidates for judicial positions 
within basic courts, the jurisdiction of 
which exclusively includes the territory 
of one or more municipalities in which 
the majority of the population belongs to 
the Kosovo Serb community, may only 
be recommended for appointment by the 
two members of the Council elected by 
Assembly deputies holding seats 
reserved or guaranteed for the Serb 
Community in the Republic of Kosovo 
acting jointly and unanimously… 
 
Although there are no reserved seats for 
minority representatives in the 9-member 
Constitutional Court, the decision on the 
proposals of two judges requires the consent of 
the majority of the deputies of the Assembly 
holding seats reserved or guaranteed for 
representatives of the Communities not in the 
majority in Kosovo (Article 114.3)  
 
 
Central Electoral Commission 
 
As a permanent body of 11 members, the 
Central Election Commission manages the 
elections and referenda in Kosovo. The Chair of 
the Central Election Commission is appointed 
by the President of Kosovo
12
. Six members are 
appointed by the largest parliamentary groups 
represented in the Assembly (one per 
parliamentarian group or proportionally if 
groups are less in number). The deputies holding 
seats reserved or guaranteed for the Kosovo Serb 
Community appoint one member and 3 members 
are appointed by the deputies holding seats 
reserved or guaranteed for other Communities 
that are not in majority in Kosovo (Article 13).  
In summary, the representatives of the 
minority communities in Kosovo, holding 
reserved seats in the Assembly (20 out of 120), 
have an important role in and have a direct 
impact on: 
 the legislative process, including 
amendments to the Constitution 
 the decision-making process and the 
leadership of the Assembly 
 the matters concerning the rights of the 
Communities 
 the executive power (Government) 
 the judicial system 
 the electoral management and control 
 
III. THE CONSTITUENCY 
BEHIND THE POWER OF 
THE RESERVED SEATS 
The Kosovo paradox emerges from the fact that 
the democracy framework empowering 
significantly the minorities is still ―seeking‖ its 
constituents!   
The official census carried out by the 
Kosovo Agency of Statistics (KAS) in 2011 
covered 34 of the 37 census areas
13
. In the 
predominantly Serb-inhabited northern 
municipalities (Zubin Potok, Zvečan/Zveçan, 
Leposavić/Leposaviq and northern 
Mitrovica/Mitrovicë) the lack of cooperation 
from local leaders and population blocked the 
data collection
14
. Furthermore, as ECMI Kosovo 
reports, stating their ―ethnic/cultural 
background‖ was a sensitive issue to the 
population from different minority 
communities
15
. 
Even these two factors alone explicate 
the discrepancies between the official census 
results and the preliminary estimates of the 
numbers of the minority communities in 
Kosovo. The census established a proportion of 
non-majority communities in Kosovo (7%), 
which is significantly lower to the previous 
estimates of around 10-12% (including northern 
Kosovo), made by ECMI Kosovo and the OSCE 
Mission in Kosovo.
16
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According to the 2011 KSA census data the 
total number of inhabitants is 1 739 825 people, 
120 204 of which belonging to non-majority 
communities. These 7% of the Kosovo 
population with an ethnic/cultural background 
different from Albanian is consisted of:  
 
 1.6% or 27 533 Bosniaks  
 1.5%  or 25 532 Serbs  
 1.1% or 18 738 Turks  
 0.9% or 15 436 Ashkali 
 0.7% or 11 524 Egyptians  
 0.6% or 10 265 Gorani  
 0.5% or 8 824 Roma  
 0.1% or 2 352 – other 
 
It is also important to mention that further 912 
people decided not to answer the census 
question and for another 1840 are indicated in 
the official results as ―data not available‖17. In 
general 2 752 people is a relevantly small 
number, but in the case of Kosovo it is of 
comparative importance scale.  
Acknowledging the ambiguity of the 
unofficially collected ethnic data, ECMI Kosovo 
has established
18
 that the census results for Serbs 
and Roma differ significantly from previous 
estimates, which was mainly due to the non-
inclusion of the largely Serb-inhabited northern 
municipalities (affecting also the census figures 
of other minority communities living in that area 
– Bosniaks and Roma) and the widespread 
boycott by the Serbs in southern Kosovo
19
. 
According to the ECMI Kosovo estimates, 
Kosovo‘s total Serb population amounts about 
140,000 people (against 25 532 census data). 
Discrepancies also have been 
established with regard to the numbers of other 
non-majority communities. The previous 
estimates of the Roma community in Kosovo of 
21,300-27,000 people differ significantly with 
the census total figure of 8,824. Although the 
number of the Ashkali community (15,436), 
established by the census correspond to the 
preliminary estimations of ECMI Kosovo and 
the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, for Egyptians, 
there are discrepancies in all data from different 
sources.  In general, the aggregated census 
figure for the three communities of Roma, 
Ashkali and Egyptians (35,784) is around 20-
30% lower than that of previous estimates
20
. 
  The census figures concerning the 
Bosniak population (27,533) are about 18% 
lower than previous OSCE estimates (33,524); 
slightly lower is also the total number of the 
Turks (18,738)   , but those of the Gorani 
population (10,265) are higher than that of 
previous estimates (8,953).  
Croat and Montenegrin population was 
not counted separately in the 2011 census.   
In summary, according to the official 
census of 2011, the total number of the 
population belonging to the minority 
communities in Kosovo amounts about 155 988 
people. Summing up the unofficial estimates, the 
non-majority population would amount to about 
300 000 people. 
 
 Estimates Census Reserved 
seats 
Additional seats in 
2010 
1 deputy represents 
estimated census 
Serbs 140 000 25 532 10 3 10 769 1 964 
Roma 
Egyptians 
Ashkali 
23-27 000 8 824 1 -- 23-27 000 8 824 
var. 11 524 1 -- var. 11 524 
15 436 15 436 2 -- 7 718 7 718 
Total 50 000 35,784 3+ 1 -- 12 500 8 946 
Bosniaks 33 524 27 533 3 1 8 381 6 883 
Turks 18 738 18 738 2 1 6 246 6 246 
Gorany 8 953 10 265 1 -- 8 953 10 265 
Others  2352 -- -- n/a n/a 
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Projecting these somewhat ambiguous 
figures against the 20 reserved seats for minority 
community representatives, it occurs that the 
Turkish and Ashkali communities enjoy the best 
political representation in the present Assembly 
of Kosovo (1 deputy representing in respectively 
6 246 and 7718 constituents). In comparison, 1 
deputy of the majority Albanian community 
represents approximately 16842 constituents.  
As it becomes clear, the legislative 
framework in Kosovo guarantees a significant 
political representation for the non-majority 
communities. But the framework itself can 
guarantee neither the quality of representation, 
nor the quality of democracy in Kosovo. It is the 
constituents themselves who must be aware and 
must bear the responsibility for exercising their 
rights and for safeguarding the political and 
institutional accomplishments. This becomes 
clear when taking into account the minority 
participation in elections and the risks to 
democracy that their passiveness and refusal to 
exercise their political rights might bring about. 
Prior to examine challenges to minority 
participation in elections, based on data 
collected by ECMI Kosovo in October and 
November 2012 during a project 
implementation, the legal framework regulating 
minority representation in the structure of the 
local governance will be presented briefly. 
IV. REPRESENTATION OF 
MINORITY COMMUNITIES 
AT LOCAL LEVEL 
Representation of minority communities in the 
Institutions of the local government is regulated 
by the Constitution and the Law on the local 
elections (LLE). The use of languages at 
municipal level is also regulated by the Law on 
Languages. 
 
As stipulated by Article 61 of the Constitution: 
 
Communities and their members shall be 
entitled to equitable representation in 
employment in public bodies and publicly 
owned enterprises at all levels, including in 
particular in the police service in areas 
inhabited by the respective Community, 
while respecting the rules concerning 
competence and integrity that govern public 
administration. 
 
According to Article 62, in municipalities where 
at least ten per cent (10%) of the residents 
belong to minority communities, the 
representation for minorities in the municipal 
executive body is guaranteed and the post of 
Vice President of the Municipal Assembly for 
Communities shall is also reserved for the 
minority candidate, who has received the most 
votes on the open list of candidates for election 
to the Municipal Assembly.  
The Vice President serves as a focal 
point for addressing non-majority Communities' 
concerns and interests in meetings of the 
Assembly and its work and reviewing 
community members complaints against acts of 
the Municipal acts (in case of claims for 
violation of their constitutional rights). The 
particular powers of the position are that in the 
event the Municipal Assembly does not address 
properly an issues, act or decision that is 
considered a violation of a constitutionally 
guaranteed right, the Vice President may submit 
the matter directly to the Constitutional Court. 
This measure provides a mechanism for 
minority control over the decisions of the 
Municipal Assemblies.  
The 10% of registered minority 
population at municipal level, entitle 
communities to the right of having a Deputy 
Mayor for Communities (LLSG, article 61) and 
a Chairperson(s) of the Municipal Assembly for 
Communities (LLSG, article 54).  
LLSG provides that the Mayor shall 
consult the Deputy Mayor for Communities 
about the matters related to non-majority 
communities and seek advice and guidance in 
connection to all relevant issues. The 
appointment and dismissal of the Deputy Mayor 
for Communities is proposed by the Mayor and 
needs the approval of the majority of the 
 ECMI- Working Paper 
 
 
12 | P a g e  
 
municipal assembly members present and voting 
and the majority of the municipal assembly 
members, present and voting belonging to the 
non-majority communities (LLSG 61.3) 
The Deputy Chairperson of a 
Municipality for Communities serves as formal 
focal point for addressing non-majority 
communities‘ concerns and interests in meetings 
of the Assembly and its work. Their 
responsibility is also to review claims by 
communities or their members against that acts 
or decisions of the municipal assembly violate 
their constitutionally guaranteed rights and to 
submit the matter directly to the Constitutional 
Court in case that the municipal assembly 
refuses to reconsider the act/decision in question 
(LLSG, Article 55) 
Although the LLSG does not provide 
any reserved seats in the Municipal Assembly to 
members of non-majority communities, Article 
53 regulates the composition of the 
Communities Committees and specifies that:  
 
Any community living in the municipality 
shall be represented by at least one 
representative in the Communities 
Committee.  The representatives of 
communities shall comprise the majority of 
the Communities Committee (LLSG 53.1) 
 
The role of the Communities Committee is to 
ensure that all municipal policies, practices and 
activities protect the rights and interests of the 
Communities and to recommend respective 
measures to the Municipal Assembly. 
V. ELECTION TURNOUT: THE 
VOTES BEHIND THE 
RESERVE SEATS 
Do Kosovo minorities exercise their rights for 
representation and control? It is very challenging 
to address the issues of what percentage of the 
people belonging to non-majority communities 
in Kosovo execute their right to vote, especially 
when at first place valid data about the real size 
of the minority communities is missing. 
Nevertheless, by analyzing the election turnout 
(taking the official results from the last 
Assembly elections, held in December 2010), it 
can be established how many voters elect a 
deputy holding a reserved seat representing 
people from the minority communities in 
Kosovo.  
According to the Central Election 
Commission (CEC)
21
 the total number of the 
registered voters for the General Elections in 
Kosovo in December 2010 was 1,632,276. The 
election turnout was 45.29%, or 738 265 people 
has exercised their constitutional right to vote. 
The total number of valid votes was 698 751. 
The votes of 643 704 people were 
divided among 7 political entities representing 
the majority Albanian community and since two 
of those did not passed the threshold of 5%, 95 
seats of the designated seats were divided among 
5 political entities proportionally following the 
Sainte-Laguë method: Democratic Party of 
Kosovo (Partia Demokratike e Kosovës) – 34 
seats, Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja 
Demokratike e Kosovës) – 27 seats, Self-
Determination (Vetëvendosje) – 14 seats, 
Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (Aleanca për 
Ardhmërinë e Kosovës) – 12 seats, New Kosovo 
Coalition (Koalicioni për Kosovë të Re) – 8 
seats. Due to the transitional Article 148 of the 
Constitution, 5 seats out of the 100 were given 
to minority parties that have passed over the 5% 
threshold. Thus, a deputy representing the 
Albanian majority in 2010 was elected by 6 775 
votes. 
The official CEC statistics reveals that 
55 047 votes supported the political entities 
representing the non-majority communities in 
Kosovo. They were distributed as follows: 
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Political entities representing Kosovo minorities  
(General elections, December 2010) Votes  % Main 
Res. 
seats 
Community 
Independent Liberal Party (Samostalna Liberalna Stranka) 14 352 2.05 2 6 
Serb 
 United Serbian List (Jedinstvena Srpska Lista) 6 004 0.86 1 3 
Serb Democratic Party of Kosovo and Metohija (Srpska 
Demokratska Stranka Kosova i Metohije) 
1 008 0.14 — 1 
Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo (Kosova Demokratik Türk 
Partisi) 
8 548 1.22 1 2 Turk 
Vakat Coalition (Koalicija Vakat) 5 296 0.76 1 1 
Bosniak 
Bosniak Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo (Bošnjačka 
Stranka Demokratske Akcije Kosova) 
1 818 0.26 — 1 
New Democratic Party (Nova Demokratska Stranka) 2 478 0.35 — 1 
Democratic Ashkali Party of Kosovo (Partia Demokratike e 
Ashkanlive të Kosovës) 
2 871 0.41 — 1 
Ashkali 
Ashkali Party for Integration (Partia Ashkalinjëve për Integrim) 1 386 0.2 — 1 
New Democratic Initiative of Kosovo (Iniciativa e Re 
Demokratike e Kosovës) 
1 690 0.24 — 1 Egyptian 
United Roma Party of Kosovo (Partia Rome e Bashkuar e 
Kosovës) 
690 0.1 — 1 Roma 
Civic Initiative of Gora (Građanska Inicijativa Gore) 787 0.11 — 1 Gorani 
Lost votes22 8 119 1.17 — — 
Turk,Egyptian 
Serb, Gorani 
Montenegrin 
Total  55 047 7.87 5 20  
Source: CEC, Rezultetet e përgjithshme/Opšte rezultati (2010) at  http://kqz-ks.org 
 
Taking into account that 8 119 votes were lost 
since the distribution of the reserved seats does 
not account for the general number of voters and 
there is no threshold for minority parties, the 
figures suggest that 46 928 voters elected 25 
deputies in 2010. Hence, on average a seat of a 
deputy representing a minority community in the 
present Assembly of Kosovo weights 1 877 
votes (or 2 346 in case if the transitional Article 
148 had not been valid). 
In fact, such an approach should not be 
applied to estimate the weight of the reserved 
seats, because the Constitution stipulates that 
communities will be represented in the 
Assembly regardless of the percentage of voters 
supporting a political entity that represents any  
 
minority community. Looking at the number of 
votes behind the seats allocated for each 
community, it appears that in 2010:  
 
 4 274 votes elected a deputy, 
representing the Turk community 
 2 398 votes elected a deputy, 
representing the Bosniak community 
 2 128 votes elected a deputy, 
representing the Ashkali community 
 1 690 votes elected a deputy, 
representing the Egyptian community 
 1 643 votes elected a deputy, 
representing the Serb community 
 787 votes elected a deputy, representing 
the Gorani community 
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 690 votes elected a deputy, representing 
the Roma community 
 
The formal comparison between the number 
of votes behind a deputy seat representing the 
Albanian majority and a reserved seat for the 
minorities, or between the numbers of 
constituents that deputies represent, could 
mislead to the conclusion that minorities in 
Kosovo are overrepresented in the Assembly. 
The complex analysis of the situation, taking 
into account not only the statistics, but also the 
political and social discourse, would suggest that 
this is not the case. Although figures might seem 
unequal, the point is that ethnic grounds might 
present a strong basis for political support 
(Crawford & Lipschutz 1998) but it will always 
be limited to the community numbers. A 
political representation that does not transcend 
the rigidness of the factors-of-difference cannot 
gather supporters on the grounds of shared civic 
interests or common goals. Hence, the reserved 
seats of the Kosovo Assembly guarantee that the 
voice of the people belonging to the minority 
communities that cannot find another political 
entity to defend their interests will be heard 
through a deputy holding a reserved seat, which 
by no means reduces the rights of the majority 
population.  
These figures however matter because of the 
significant powers are vested in these 20 
Assembly seats reserved for representatives of 
the non-majority communities in Kosovo. The 
low election turnout would not reduce their 
number but the political passiveness and non-
participation in elections of minority 
constituents can contribute to abuses of the 
democratic framework in place and could bring 
about deformities in the newly established 
democracy.  
Before addressing some of the shortfalls that 
could result from the low level of minority 
participation in elections, it is important to 
consider the factors that create obstacles to the 
representatives on non-majority communities in 
Kosovo to exercise their democratic and 
constitutional rights and to cast their votes.  
VI. CHALLENGES TO MINORITY 
PARTICIPATION IN 
ELECTIONS 
In October and November 2012 ECMI Kosovo 
implemented a 2-month project „Enhancing 
Minority Communities‟ Understanding of 
Kosovo‟s Electoral System‟23 in partnership with 
the International Foundation for Electoral 
System (IFES) and 5 Kosovo NGOs
24
. The 
overall goal of the project was to increase 
minority communities‘ understanding of 
Kosovo‘s electoral system. The information 
campaign ―MERR PJESË/UČESTVUJ‖ 
comprised three main activities targeting a wider 
public of minority communities as well as key 
stakeholders and potential multipliers:  
 
 disseminating information on the 
Kosovo‘s electoral system in minority 
inhabited areas through user-friendly 
leaflets, MERR PJESË website and 
social media 
 organising and broadcasting four TV 
shows in minority languages and of 
promotional videos (in three languages - 
Turkish, Bosniak, and Roma)  
 organising 20 public information 
meetings organized in 15 municipalities 
in all regions in Kosovo 
 
To increase understanding of the electoral 
system and the importance of participation in the 
electoral process, ECMI Kosovo targeted local 
representatives, civil society and other 
stakeholders and potential multipliers of non-
Albanian and non-Serb communities in Kosovo. 
According to the ECMI Kosovo estimates, the 
dissemination of information over the 2 months 
period through printed and electronic media 
reached directly and indirectly: 
 
 Leaflets - 18 900 people 
 Social media, YouTube and ECMI 
webpage – 3 453 people 
 TV shows – 11 000 people 
 Promotional videos – 15 000 people 
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ECMI Kosovo activities raised awareness of the 
rights and responsibilities of citizens, including 
voting rights, and practical information about the 
importance of participation in the elections, 
types of election, identification necessary to 
establish eligibility, voter registration 
requirements, and mechanisms for voting. In 
order to overcome the limitations of one-way 
line of communication provided by printed 
materials and mass media, ECMI Kosovo 
organized 20 public information meetings aimed 
at providing more detailed information to key 
minority stakeholders as well as allowing for 
interactive sessions of questions and answers.  
A total of 376 community members were 
reached 
directly through the public information 
meetings. Although there is no accurate way to 
measure the number of people reached indirectly 
(i.e. informed by one of the minority community 
members reached directly), ECMI Kosovo has 
estimated that on average each person reached 
directly will discuss the information received 
with two (2) additional individuals. Thus, 1,128 
community members were reached during the 
campaign where approximately 35% or 
converted in numbers 394 of participants were 
females.
25
 
 
 
Public Information Meetings 
Municipalities Community/Communities  Participants  
Gjilan/ Gnjilane  Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian  17  
Kamenicë/ Kamenica  Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian  20  
Mitrovicë/a  Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian  20  
Mitrovicë/a  Bosniak  18  
Fushë Kosovë/ Kosovo Polje  Montenegrin  15  
Mamushë / Mamuša  Turk  15  
Gjakovë/ Ðakovica  Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian  16  
Prizren  Turk  20  
Prizren  Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian  23  
Village Plemetina/Plemetin municipality of 
Obiliq/Obilić  
Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian  22  
Ferizaj/ Uroševac  Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian  24  
Pejë/Peć  Bosniak  18  
Pejë/Peć  Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian  17  
Dragash/ Dragaš  Bosniak  19  
Prizren  Bosniak  35  
Janjevë/ Janjevo  Community/Communities  12  
Fushë Kosovë/ Kosovo Polje  Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian  25  
Gračanica/ Graçanicë  Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian  15  
Village Prilužje/ Priluzhë municipality of Vushtrri 
/Vučitrn  
Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian  10  
Village Magurë municipality of Lipjan/ Ljipljan  Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian  15  
 
The information gathered during these meetings 
with the representatives of non-Albanian and 
non-Serb communities throughout Kosovo 
enlightens some of the challenges that minorities 
face and that creates impediments to their 
participation in elections.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE CHALLENGES 
 
 Civic and voter registration 
 
 In many localities throughout Kosovo Roma 
voters cannot register to participate in elections, 
partly due to failure of Roma to register their 
residence with the authorities and hence lack 
identity documents. In Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 
region for example 56% of Roma, Ashkali, and 
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Egyptian eligible voters were not register in the 
Voter list. Other groups, such as the 
Montenegrin women in Uglar/Ugljare village, 
also face problems with issuing of identity and 
other personal documents.  
 
First time voters and people that live outside 
Kosovo face difficulties in controlling that 
their information is updated in the civil 
registry office and they will be able to vote 
(comments from Mamushe/Mamuša 
Municipality). 
 
 Voting locations 
 In the last elections a polling station was located 
in 5 km distance of the location where minority 
community resides (Kamenice 
municipality/Berivojce Village), which created 
serious impediments to the participation of 
Roma voters.  
 
SECURITY CHALLENGES 
 
 Bosniak representatives in the public 
information meeting in Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 
openly showed their dissatisfaction with 
local and international institutions for the 
non-fulfilment of minimum security 
requirements in order to allow them to vote 
and be voted in the northern municipalities 
of Kosovo. In 2010 seven villages in 
northern Kosovo boycotted elections for 
security reasons. 
 
POLITICAL CHALLENGES 
 
 Political parties 
Widespread perception of stakeholders is 
that the political parties do not represent 
their interests and do not defend their rights 
in reality. Elected political representatives 
cannot be rendered accountable to their 
stakeholders (no such mechanisms) and 
hence they are not much trusted.  
 
 Political apathy 
ECMI Kosovo has registered higher levels 
of political apathy and lack of knowledge 
about the minority representatives both at 
both local and central level.   
 
 
 Dissatisfaction of current representation 
(lack of accountability) 
 Stakeholders do not feel connected with 
their representatives and are dissatisfied 
with the level of protection of their rights 
and interests resulting from the political 
representation both at local and central level. 
Roma community in Kamenice municipality 
wanted to cast the Rome representative off. 
The lack of involvement of representatives 
with community problems and the lack of 
direct communication between deputies and 
stakeholders are also among the factors that 
hold back people from casting their votes in 
elections. The distance between the 
Assembly deputies and the local problems is 
perceived widely and leads to aspirations for 
claiming reserved seats at local level.  
 
The lack of mechanisms to render the 
representatives accountable to the 
stakeholders community allows the deputies 
holding reserved seats to act ―as individuals‖ 
and not as community representatives 
(comments from Bosniaks in Prizren).  
 
 Lack of representation 
The fact that the Constitution does not 
entitle Croat and Montenegrin communities 
to reserved seats, is perceived as a form of 
discrimination to these communities that 
need to seek political representation with 
other minority parties (comments from 
Janjeve/Janjevo Municipality).  
 
Lack of political representation at Municipal 
level (since there are no reserved seats in the 
Municipal assemblies and in regions where 
the minority population is below 10% the 
Constitutional provisions for guaranteeing a 
post in the local self-government do not 
apply) also increases dissatisfaction with the 
political processes in Kosovo (comments 
from Bosniak community in 
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica Municipality). 
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Civil initiative is still underdeveloped – 
there are locations like Uglar/Ugljare 
village, where there is no forum, council or 
civic initiative and/or group dealing with 
communities concerns. 
 
 Manipulation of votes 
Election irregularities and manipulation of 
minority votes has a twofold negative 
impact on democratic processes. On one 
hand it changes the vote of the constituents 
and on the other hand it reduces the trust of 
the stakeholders in the system and in the 
political processes and hence decreases the 
turn out rates. Manipulation of vote from 
political parties‘ representatives at the 
polling station Committees (commented by 
the Roma community in 
Gracanica/Gracanica) or been cases of 
stuffed ballots upon the closure of voting 
(reported in Dragash/Dragaš Municipality) 
cannot increase participation in elections.  
 
Acknowledging the corruption/pressure 
factors at local level during elections, 
representatives of the minorities in 
Mamushe/Mamuša Municipality have 
demanded to ECMI Kosovo that CEC shall 
include representatives of other 
municipalities during election processes 
with the purpose to ensure that irregularities 
are avoided and votes are protected.  
 
The lack of awareness and information 
about how and whom to notify about 
detected election irregularities the polling 
stations eventually results in not reporting 
those to the respective authorities.  
 
 Voting culture  
Family voting has emerged as an issue. 
Minority voters and election officials need 
to obtain better understanding of the 
democratic rules and procedures in order to 
be able to exercise properly their rights 
overcoming culturally related 
predispositions.   
 
 
 Women participation  
Women still face challenges to participate in 
elections. ECMI Kosovo has established that 
there is a need for developing gender-
sensitive voter and civic education messages 
that highlight the capacities of women as 
candidates and political leaders, encourage 
women to run for office, break down 
negative stereotypes of women, and promote 
women‘s full participation in the electoral 
process. 
 
INFORMATION/EDUCATION 
CHALLENGES 
 
 In almost all public information meetings 
held by ECMI Kosovo in October and 
November 2012 non-majority community 
members requested to have similar 
campaigns in the future, especially in 
periods prior to election campaigns in order 
to continue the awareness raising on the 
importance of participation in the elections 
and the weight of their votes. 
 
In certain areas, members of non-majority 
communities do not have sufficient 
knowledge of the institutions responsible for 
administration of elections, e.g. the Election 
Panel for Complaints and Appeals.  
 
The lack of proper pre-election education 
campaign result in a high number of non-
valid ballots (about 40 000 in 2010) 
 
SOCIAL CHALLENGES 
 
 Although social issues are not challenges to 
political participation per se, these should be 
taken into account since the concerns with 
living conditions not only affects the 
political agenda and shift people‘s focus 
away from issues of political representation 
(and surely place it on the survival needs), 
but also can open door for negative practices 
that could deform and corrupt democracy. 
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The public meetings organised by ECMI 
Kosovo were used by a number or minority 
representatives as a platform for sharing 
their concerns with the high unemployment, 
poor infrastructure, poor living conditions, 
the property rights, economic migration, 
healthcare, segregation, education and 
schooling issues.   
 
These concerns ought not to be ignored and 
rendered irrelevant to the political processes 
because problems that affect daily life of 
people could easily be transformed into 
political stakes and then trading votes for 
services might become a practice. The fact 
that these issues were brought about before 
or alongside the discussions about the 
minority political representation and voting 
indicates that people are currently more 
interested with their well-being than with 
exercising their constitutional and civil 
democratic rights.  
VII. MINORITY PARTICIPATION 
IN ELECTIONS MATTERS  
Low election turnout in general is a challenge to 
democracy since it might open the door to 
negative processes and phenomena. Political 
passiveness of citizens in the context of 
advanced and consolidated democracies might 
not bring about deformities, since there are 
mechanisms for checks and balances, 
established rules and procedures as well as 
institutional apparatus safeguarding the 
supremacy of the rule of law.  New democracies 
however are exposed to the negative impacts 
resulting from low election turnout, resulting 
from disappointment with political processes 
and developments, following the initial 
enthusiasm that has driven democratic changes.   
In the case of the Kosovo Communities, the 
low election turnout of minority voters might 
lead to serious deformities in the democratic 
processes and practices. As it was indicated in 
the first part of the analysis, the weight of the 
―small‖ number of 20 seats reserved or 
guaranteed for representatives on the non-
Albanian communities in the Assembly, is 
significant. The 20 deputies in facts have a direct 
impact on the:  
 
 Constitutional amendments 
 Legislative process, especially with 
regard to the legislation of vital interest:  
1. Laws changing municipal boundaries, 
establishing or abolishing municipalities, 
defining the scope of powers of 
municipalities and their participation in 
inter-municipal and cross-border 
relations; 
2. Laws implementing the rights of 
Communities and their members, other 
than those set forth in the Constitution; 
3. Laws on the use of language; 
4. Laws on local elections; 
5. Laws on protection of cultural heritage; 
6. Laws on religious freedom or on 
agreements with religious communities; 
7. Laws on education; 
8. Laws on the use of symbols, including 
Community symbols and on public 
holidays, 
 Decision-making process and the 
leadership of the Assembly 
 Matters concerning the rights of the 
Communities 
 Executive power (Government) 
 Judicial system 
 Electoral management and control 
 
At the same time, as the analysis unveiled, 
currently about 2 000 voters in average (starting 
from 690 for a Roma representative to 4 274 for 
a Turk community representative) appoint a 
deputy on a reserved seat. This small number of 
stakeholders casting their vote in elections is 
already a risk to the democratic process and the 
political representation of minorities per se.  
Taking into account current negative 
political practices, a possible scenario can 
foresee the emergence of political entrepreneurs 
who aspiring for political power would aim at 
taking control of reserved seats. The 
Constitution of Kosovo regulates the minority 
representation, but it does not provide any legal 
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requirements about the quality of such 
representation, nor does it specify mechanisms 
for rending such deputy accountable to their 
stakeholders. The legislation that regulates the 
political representation of communities in 
elections is the General Electoral Law, which 
requires that a political entity when applying for 
certification indicates:  
 
...whether it wishes to contest any of the 
seats guaranteed for the representation of 
Kosovo Serb and other non-majority 
communities under Article 64 of the 
Constitution (GEL, 15.11) 
 
Projecting such a possibility to the number of 
voters behind a reserved seat, it appears that in a 
negative scenario, buying votes for securing a 
seat in the Assembly is quite a feasible option. 
Other mechanisms for acquiring deputy 
positions in a non-democratic way is by 
―motivating‖ the limited number of voters by 
putting pressure upon their free chose, by 
altering the vote of the electorate or by 
dispersing the votes of the stakeholders.  
The prospects for the first scenario of 
non-democratic acquisition of seats in the 
Assembly (buying votes) emerge from the 
testimonials of community members, 
summarised above in the section ―challenges to 
participation‖. As election experience from 
established democracies suggests (e.g. Bulgaria) 
trading votes has been an ―established‖ practice 
for groups to secure services or to meet some 
basic needs. Hence, the expressed concerns of 
community representatives from Kosovo 
municipalities with social issues in the context 
of the discussions related to participation in 
election should be considered in the light of the 
possible shortfalls and addressed respectively.  
Evidences from the field suggest that the 
second type of negative scenario – pressure upon 
voters – is also a risk before the political 
representation of minorities and the democracy 
in Kosovo in general. The reported ―security 
concerns‖ are only one, although significant, 
aspect of the problem. While serious, these 
issues can be addressed by respective measures 
in the areas of higher tensions. The other aspect, 
which is rather difficult to tackle once emerged, 
is the pressure that voters could experience at 
local level. Reported cases from the field are 
currently related to experience in local elections 
(e.g. at the second round of the local and at the 
Mayoral elections in Dragash/Dragaš 
municipality
26
). Although an emerging problem 
in connection with local elections, this is still not 
such an issue with regard to the general elections 
because of the fact that Kosovo is currently a 
single electoral district while communities 
(despite locations of consolidates settlements) 
are dispersed throughout the country. Hence, as 
long as the vote of minority communities 
consolidates at a national basis, pressure on 
voters in local polling stations would have a 
minimum negative effect. In the case of  
multiple electoral districts, pressure upon 
communities there might become greater since 
the outcomes of the regional vote would have 
more weight against the final election results and 
it would be much easier to mobilise the needed 
number of people to elect a designated candidate 
from a party that has been certified as 
representing a minority community.  
Reasons to consider the risks of altering 
the minority vote emerge from the testimonials 
related to irregularities detected during elections 
at local polling stations. The lack of knowledge 
about the procedures and institutions they could 
address their complaints to result in ‗silence‘ 
about noticed irregularities which eventually 
affects the trust in the institutions, in the political 
system and in the value of participation in 
elections in general. In the case of the small 
number of voters electing a deputy for a 
reserved seat, ‗ballot thefts‘ can change 
significantly the election outcomes. 
The ―family voting‖ is another type of 
pressure that eliminated the possibility for a 
democratic choice.  
Fragmentation of the political 
representation of minorities can also be used by 
political entrepreneurs as a mechanism for 
taking a hold of reserved seats. The fact that 
there is no threshold for minority parties to enter 
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the Assembly on one hand provides a possibility 
to small parties to run in the elections. At the 
same time, the lack of a threshold is a factor for 
defragmentation of the minority parties. When 
any political entity, despite the number of the 
supporting stakeholders, can compete on equal 
grounds, this can easily result in swarming of 
political parties claiming to represent minority 
communities. As it could be seen from the 
results of the general elections in 2010, 1.7% or 
8119 minority votes were lost since the parties 
that those were given for could not appoint a 
deputy. Projecting again to the average of 2000 
votes behind a reserved seat, this appears to be a 
significant number. Surely, it does not mean that 
minorities would have more seats in the 
Assembly, but it means that the elected deputies 
are more likely to represent a local group of the 
minority community, than the community at 
large. This problem has been illustrated by the 
complaints of the stakeholders, recorded by 
ECMI Kosovo, that people do not feel that they 
are being represented at local or central level.  
Hence, a mechanism for dispersing the 
minority vote can be the registration of 
numerous smaller parties that might attempt to 
divert the local vote of the constituents in order 
that a consolidated group of voters elect a 
designated candidate to ―represent‖ the 
particular community. In this context, a very 
low, but existing threshold could have a positive 
effect both on reducing the risk of manipulating 
the election results by engineering minority 
parties, and on the process of consolidation of 
the political representation of minorities and 
strengthening the connection between political 
candidates (parties) and the stakeholders 
throughout the country.  
The lack of information, knowledge about 
the electoral process and awareness about the 
weight of the reserved seats is also a problem 
that needs to be addressed for guaranteeing true 
political representation of minority communities 
in Kosovo. As it was discussed above, a high 
number of non-valid votes (about 40 000 in total 
in the elections of 2010) should not be 
acceptable phenomena, if on average 2000 
people elect a deputy to a reserved seat. The 
evidences from the field gathered by ECMI 
Kosovo suggest that community members at 
large are not fully aware about the election rules 
and procedures.  
Finally, apart from pre-election educational 
campaigns to make people aware of election 
rules, procedures and technicalities, members of 
non-majority communities in Kosovo need to 
understand the weight of their vote and the risks 
resulting from their passiveness. Because 
although their Constitutional rights (among 
which the right of reserved seats in the 
Assembly) cannot be affected negatively by 
decrease of the number of community members, 
minority rights can be limited through the 
democratic procedures when political 
entrepreneurs push away genuine community 
representatives. A similar situation was observed 
in Hungary in the context of the minority self-
governance system that has led to the 
amendments of the law in 2005 in order to 
prevent opportunists from abusing the 
established structures. In other words, if the 
reserved seats in the Assembly of Kosovo are 
taken by political entrepreneurs that in fact do 
not represent the respective communities, their 
vote can have a negative impact on the 
democratic arrangements in the country and on 
the rights of minorities.  
VIII. Conclusion  
Minority participation in the political process in 
Kosovo is a necessary factor for safeguarding 
the democratic framework installed by the 
existing legislation and for guaranteeing equality 
of political representation. In order to enable this 
participation, a number of challenges need to be 
addressed by local and international institutions, 
but also by the stakeholders, who should become 
aware of the weight of their vote of the risks to 
democracy resulting from non-voting. Raising 
awareness among member of minority 
communities requires continuous efforts and 
long-term educational activities.  
The lack of mechanisms for 
accountability of elected minority 
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representatives to their stakeholders challenges 
participation in elections by decreasing levels of 
trust and increasing disappointment with the 
political representation and hence with the 
system and the institutions. This has a direct 
negative impact on voter turnout at elections.  
A deputy holding a reserved seat in the 
Assembly of Kosovo must truly act as a 
community representative and not as an 
individual. Since there are no legal mechanisms 
for rendering such a deputy accountable to the 
respective community, instruments for civil 
control need to be developed. This entails 
strengthening of civil society and supporting the 
establishment of citizens‘ organisations in order 
to advocate community interests at local and 
central level.   
Finally, the pieces of legislation that are 
not under the ―direct‖ control of the political 
representatives of the non-majority communities 
in Kosovo, but might have a significant impact 
on the minority representation are the Law on 
General Elections and the Election Rules, issues 
by the Central Electoral Commission.  
With regard to the ongoing debate about 
the changes of the electoral system in Kosovo 
(regulated by the Law of General Elections, 
which could be amended by simple majority 
vote), minority stakeholders, local and 
international institutions and organisations, 
concerned with the rights of minorities, should 
be aware of the various aspects of the negative 
impact that the introduction of multiple-electoral 
districts might bring about with respect to the 
political representation of communities in 
Kosovo.  
The Law on General Elections defines 
electoral thresholds (currently 5% for political 
entities representing the Albanian community 
and none for the political entities representing 
the non-majority communities) as well as the 
requirements before parties claiming that they 
represent minority communities. Elaboration of 
a set of criteria with regard to guaranteeing true 
political representation and including those in 
the LGE should be considered. In general, any 
suggested amendments to the LGE should be 
carefully analysed in the light of minority rights 
protection.   
CEC rules need also to be monitored 
and assessed in the context of ensuring 
possibilities for adequate political representation 
of minorities in Kosovo.  
In conclusion, ensuring the quality of 
democracy in Kosovo lies not only in the powers 
of the local and international organisations, but 
mainly in the hands of the stakeholders. 
Minority rights are guaranteed by the existing 
legislative framework, but its adequate 
implementation depends on the active 
participation of the members of the non-majority 
communities in Kosovo.  
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